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THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION IN 
THE LAW OF CONTRACT 
Andrew Robertson 
In the law of contract questions of risk allocation properly turn, where possible, on interpretation of 
the agreement. This article will explore the limits of that approach. It will do so by considering two 
doctrines that lie at the boundaries of contract interpretation: the implication of terms in fact and 
the remoteness principle. Both doctrines have been commonly understood as gap-filling rules, but in 
two influential judgments Lord Hoffmann sought to recast them as interpretative principles. It will 
be argued in this article that the implication of terms in fact can properly be regarded as an 
interpretative exercise, but the same cannot be said of the application of the remoteness doctrine. 
The implication of terms in fact can helpfully be understood as interpretative, provided care is taken 
to explain the paths of reasoning leading to the conclusion that a contractual instrument must be 
understood to include a particular unexpressed term. Because no common paths of interpretative 
reasoning can be identified for the determination of remoteness questions, it is unsettling and 
counterproductive to attempt to take an interpretative approach to these questions. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Because the law of contract is primarily concerned with rights, obligations and allocations of 
risk that are created by contracting parties, its primary mode of problem solving is interpretative. 
Legal advisers and courts quite properly turn first to interpretation to resolve questions about which 
party bears a particular risk. While any problem-solving exercise must begin with interpretation, as 
one moves away from the direct application of clearly expressed terms the agreement necessarily 
becomes less and less determinate. A significant difficultly in the law of contract lies in determining 
when the interpretative process must end, and what principles should be applied to resolve questions 
that cannot be resolved through interpretation.  
The implication of terms and the remoteness limitation on the recovery of contract damages 
provide ideal subject matter for considering the limits of interpretation in the law of contract 
because they lie at or around the point at which interpretation shades into gap filling. In recent years 
interpretation has come to be recognised as one of the most important topics – perhaps the most 
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important topic – in the law of contract. Lord Hoffmann has played a central role in the rise in the 
prominence of contractual interpretation, and in the modern development and explication of its 
principles. In the latter years of his great judicial career Lord Hoffmann sought to extend the reach 
of those principles, championing interpretative approaches to the implication of terms 1  and 
remoteness of damage.2 Neither development was novel, but both have attracted a great deal of 
attention around the common law world. 
Lord Hoffmann's interpretative reformulations of implication and remoteness have had mixed 
success. Both have generated controversy in the academic literature.3 Both have been rejected by 
the Singapore Court of Appeal4 and embraced by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales.5 
While Lord Hoffmann's reformulated remoteness principle is now understood to represent the law in 
England, his analysis of implication has recently been held by a majority of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court not to provide authoritative guidance on the law of implied terms.6 It will be argued 
that it is in fact Lord Hoffmann's reorientation of the implication of terms that stands up to close 
scrutiny and represents a positive development, while the same cannot be said of his reformulation 
of remoteness. The implication of terms in fact can properly, and helpfully, be regarded as an 
interpretative exercise, but the application of the remoteness doctrine cannot. 
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(Comm) 1185; and John Grimes Partnership Ltd v Gubbins [2013] EWCA Civ 37. 
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WLR 1843 [BNP Paribas (SC)] at [24] per Lord Neuberger with whom Lord Sumption, Lord Hodge and 
Lord Clarke agreed.  
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II THE IMPLICATION OF TERMS7 
A From Gap-filling Rules to Ascertaining Meaning 
A number of attempts have been made over the years to encapsulate the basis on which terms 
are implied in fact. One of the best-known statements in the law of contract is Lord Justice Bowen's 
identification of the law's object in the implication of terms, which "is to give such business efficacy 
to the transaction" as the parties must have intended.8 And one of the law's most memorable figures 
is Lord Justice MacKinnon's officious bystander, who would have been testily suppressed by the 
parties if he had bothered them at the time of contracting about "something so obvious that it goes 
without saying".9 Both the notion of something necessary for business efficacy and something so 
obvious that it goes without saying were included in the well-known list identified by Lord Simon in 
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings of five conditions that must be satisfied for a 
term to be implied, along with requirements that the term must be reasonable and equitable, capable 
of clear expression and must not contradict any of the express terms.10 
In Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd the Privy Council held that the implication 
of terms is no more or less than an exercise in determining what a reasonable addressee would 
understand the contract to mean. Giving the judgment of the Board, Lord Hoffmann held that the 
various tests for the implication of terms are simply reformulations of this question and must not be 
"treated as different or additional tests" or "as if they had a life of their own".11 The Privy Council 
declared that, in the implication of terms, "[t]here is only one question: is that what the instrument, 
read as a whole against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean?"12 
The gist of the Belize Telecom approach has been accepted by the New Zealand courts, though 
notably Lord Hoffmann's idea that "there is only one question" has not been embraced at the 
appellate level.13 It has been noted that the elements of the BP Refinery formulation remain useful 
  
7  This section draws on Andrew Robertson "The Foundations of Implied Terms: Logic, Efficacy and 
Purpose" in Simone Degeling, James Edelman and James Goudkamp (eds) Contracts in Commercial Law 
(Thomson/LawBook Co, Sydney, 2016) (forthcoming). 
8  The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 (CA) at 68. 
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indicators,14 and business efficacy has remained centrally important in the application of what is 
essentially a hybrid set of principles.15 The Court of Appeal of England and Wales went further, 
taking the view that Belize Telecom had introduced a new approach to the implication of terms, and 
even a new test.16 More recently, however, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has held that 
Belize Telecom did not change the law in England.17 According to Lord Neuberger (with whom 
Lord Sumption, Lord Hodge and Lord Clarke agreed), Lord Hoffmann's observations are open to 
"interpretations [that] are wrong in law" and "should henceforth be treated as a characteristically 
inspired discussion rather than authoritative guidance on the law of implied terms".18 A slightly 
modified version of the BP Refinery criteria was held to represent the law in England, with business 
efficacy and obviousness serving as alternatives.19 Lord Carnwath alone argued for the continuing 
authority of the judgment in Belize Telecom, which he regarded as "a valuable and illuminating 
synthesis of the factors which should guide the court".20 
B Meaning and Construction 
While Lord Simon's judgment in BP Refinery seemed to offer a set of rules for filling gaps in 
incomplete contracts, Lord Hoffmann in Belize Telecom sought to reorient the implication of terms 
and recast it as an interpretative exercise. Whether the implication of terms properly can be 
understood as an interpretative exercise is the question that will now be addressed. 
To the extent that it seeks to ascertain the meaning of a contractual instrument, the implication 
of terms is concerned with the determination of the applicative meaning of the instrument: it seeks 
to solve a puzzle about the application of the instrument to a particular case.21 This is properly 
understood as an exercise in construction in the sense identified by Francis Leiber in his 1839 book 
on legal hermeneutics.22 The implication of terms deals with issues not directly addressed by a text 
by drawing conclusions that are based on elements within the text. Those conclusions can therefore 
  
14  Hickman v Turn and Wave Ltd, above n 13, at [248]. 
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18  At [31]. 
19  At [21]. 
20  At [74]. 
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Richard H Fallon "The Meaning of Legal 'Meaning' and Its Implications for Theories of Legal 
Interpretation" (2015) 82 U Chi L Rev 1235 at 1238. 
22  Francis Lieber Legal and Political Hermeneutics (Little and Brown, Boston, 1839) at 56. 
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be said to be within the spirit of the text, rather than the letter.23 The crucially important context for 
implication in most cases does not consist of circumstances extrinsic to the instrument, but of 
inferences about the nature and purposes of the instrument and particular provisions within it. 
The Belize Telecom case has sometimes been said to introduce a new "test" for the implication 
of terms. In X v Y, for example, Toogood J held that:24 
A term is implied where such a term would spell out in express words what the contract, read against the 
relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean. That is the test. 
That test is not easy to apply directly to particular facts, for the following reason. The 
implication of terms is a problem-solving exercise. The question is whether the instrument, broadly 
construed in its commercial context, both identifies a solution to the problem that has arisen and 
indicates that the solution is to govern the problem. In most implied terms cases the difficulty lies 
not in identifying a solution but in determining whether the obvious solution is to be applied to 
resolve the problem, or whether, alternatively, the risk lies where it falls according to the express 
terms. Asking whether the claimed implied term spells out what the contract would reasonably be 
understood to mean does not in itself tell us whether the obvious solution is to be applied. A further 
reasoning process is needed. 
This point is illustrated by reference to the facts of the two most important recent cases on 
implied terms: Belize Telecom and Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas. In Belize Telecom the 
essential facts were that the articles of association of a partially privatised telecommunications 
company were structured so as to facilitate a sharing of control between the Government and private 
investors, with power given to different classes of shareholders to elect and remove directors. The 
articles provided that if a person held two different kinds of share then that person would have the 
power to appoint two directors. The articles said nothing about what was to happen if a person 
exercised that power and then ceased to hold one of the two qualifying classes of share. When this 
occurred, the two directors in question were, on the face of the articles, irremovable. There was an 
obvious solution to the problem: the articles clearly should have provided that any directors 
appointed by the special shareholder should be removed automatically upon its ceasing to hold the 
qualifying shareholding. Automatic removal was the obvious solution, but did the articles mean that 
there was to be automatic removal, or did they simply leave a gap? How can we tell?  
The situation in Belize Telecom can be contrasted with the facts of Marks and Spencer v BNP 
Paribas in order to illustrate the point. The latter case concerned a lease under which rent was 
  
23  At 56. 
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Dysart Timbers Ltd [2009] NZSC 43, [2009] 3 NZLR 160 at [25]. See also BNP Paribas (CA), above n 5, 
at [11] and [21]–[24] (implicitly disapproved by the Supreme Court on appeal BNP Paribas (SC), above n 
6, at [22]–[31]). 
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payable quarterly in advance. A break clause gave the tenant an entitlement to terminate the lease on 
payment of a substantial break premium, but provided for the lease to come to an end part way 
through a rent period. The advance rent representing the period following the break date became a 
windfall for the landlord unless it was repayable. Because the landlord already had the benefit of the 
break premium, it was clear that the lease should have provided that the landlord was obliged to 
repay the portion of advance rent representing the period following the break date. That was the 
obvious solution to the windfall problem. But did the lease mean that the landlord was under such 
an obligation? How do we go about answering that question? 
In each of these two cases it is easy to identify the obvious solution to the problem that arose, 
but much more difficult to say whether the contract means that the obvious solution is to govern the 
problem. A process of reasoning is needed in implied terms cases to determine whether the 
instrument, properly construed, both identifies a solution to the problem that has arisen and indicates 
that the solution is to govern the problem. The crucial question is how we determine whether the 
contract means that the obvious but unarticulated solution governs the problem. 
C Identifying the Paths of Reasoning 
Lord Hoffmann posed the meaning question in two different ways in Belize Telecom: first as a 
question of what the contract means and secondly as a question of what the contract must mean.25 
The latter formulation is more helpful because it leads us to consider the basis of the imperative, and 
therefore to identify the process of reasoning involved in determining what the contract must mean. 
The cases show that there are three different bases on which we might conclude that the instrument 
must mean that the obvious solution governs the problem: first, that may be what the instrument 
must mean as a matter of language and logic; secondly, it may be what the instrument must mean in 
order to make the transaction workable; and thirdly, it may be what the instrument must mean in 
order to avoid defeating a subsidiary purpose underlying the instrument or a particular provision of 
the instrument. 
1 Necessitated by language and logic 
Implied terms within the first category undoubtedly represent the meaning of the instrument. 
They are implications arising as a matter of logic or necessary inference from the language of the 
express terms of the contract. The clearest example of an implied term within this category is a 
negative covenant which is the corollary of an express promise. A promise to take all requirements 
of electricity from a particular supplier implies a promise not to take electricity from any other 
supplier.26 Other cases are less clear. An example of a case at the outer edge of this category is Hart 
  
25  Belize Telecom, above n 1, at [16], [18] and [19]. See also at [21] ("would reasonably be understood to 
mean"), and [22] and [27] ("actually means"). 
26  Metropolitan Electric Supply Co Ltd v Ginder [1901] 2 Ch 799. 
 THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT 197 
v MacDonald, where a promise to pay a purchase price for machinery out of the proceeds of a dairy 
was held to imply a promise to operate the dairy.27 The obligation to operate the dairy was a logical 
implication from the fact that the price was to be paid, but only from the proceeds of the dairy.  
Implications of this kind are sometimes referred to as a "constructional implication",28 but this may 
be considered an unhelpful label if it is accepted, as argued here, that all terms implied in fact are 
identified through a process of construction. Whatever the label, it cannot be disputed that terms 
implied within this category do no more than spell out what a reasonable person would understand 
the instrument to mean. 
2 Necessary to give business efficacy to the contract 
The second basis for implication is that a problem has arisen in the application of the contract 
which must be resolved in order to give the contract business efficacy or make it work, and there is 
an obvious solution to the problem. The element of business efficacy goes primarily to the quality of 
the problem and establishes that the problem is one that must be solved. It goes hand in hand with 
the requirement of obviousness: the problem can only be solved if there is an obvious solution 
which must be understood to have been implicitly adopted. The element of obviousness goes to the 
quality of the solution and establishes that this particular solution must be applied to resolve the 
problem. It is the need to make the contract workable that supplies the imperative and justifies the 
conclusion that the obvious solution must be implied in order to save the contract.29 
3 Necessary to avoid defeating a contractual purpose 
The third basis on which it can be concluded that a contract must be understood to include an 
implied term is that the term is necessary to avoid defeating a contractual purpose. Necessity to 
avoid defeating a contractual purpose has clearly operated as a basis for deciding some important 
cases, but has not yet been acknowledged as a basis for implication. Where a contractual purpose 
goes to the heart of the bargain and an implication is needed to prevent that core contractual purpose 
from being defeated (either by circumstances or by the actions of one of the parties) then an 
implication can be justified under the business efficacy principle. But contracts also have subsidiary 
purposes, which do not go to the heart of the bargain, and implications are sometimes necessary to 
protect those subsidiary purposes. Like business efficacy, necessity to avoid defeating a contractual 
purpose is coupled with obviousness as a basis for implication. Necessity to avoid defeating a 
  
27  Hart v MacDonald (1910) 10 CLR 417 (HCA). 
28  See for example Mosvolds Rederi A/S v Food Corp of India [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 68 (QB (Comm)) at 70. 
29  This is broadly consistent with the notion that business efficacy and obviousness are cumulative and 
complementary requirements, which was developed by Andrew Phang "Implied Terms Revisited" [1990] 
JBL 394 at 396; and Andrew Phang "The Challenge of Principled Gap-Filling: A Study of Implied Terms in 
a Comparative Context" [2014] JBL 263 at 287–295. The notion was adopted in Forefront Medical 
Technology (Pte) Ltd v Modern-Pak Pte Ltd [2006] SGHC 3, [2006] 1 SLR (R) 927 at [33]–[40]; and 
Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd, above n 4, at [90]. 
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contractual purpose goes to the quality of the problem – establishing that the problem is one that 
must be solved – while the element of obviousness goes to the suitability of the solution – 
establishing that the particular solution must be what solves the problem. 
It was the combination of necessity to avoid defeating a contractual purpose and the presence of 
an obvious solution that justified the conclusion in Belize Telecom that the articles of association 
must be understood to include the implied term. Lord Hoffmann said that:30 
… the implication is required to avoid defeating what appears to have been the overriding purpose of the 
machinery of appointment and removal of directors, namely to ensure that the board reflects the 
appropriate shareholder interests in accordance with the scheme laid out in the articles. 
The reasoning in Belize Telecom therefore supports the notion that a reasonable addressee will be 
compelled to conclude that a term is implied if such a term is necessary to give effect to a 
contractual purpose. 
A second example is Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman.31 In that case the society 
issued two different types of life assurance policy which drew on a single investment pool. One type 
provided an annuity rate guarantee and one did not. When the market rate for annuities fell below 
the guaranteed rate, the directors began adjusting the final bonus for those policyholders who had 
the benefit of an annuity rate guarantee and chose to take the guaranteed rate. The directors adopted 
that practice in order to ensure that investment returns were distributed equally between those with 
the annuity rate guarantee and those without. This effectively neutralised the annuity rate guarantee. 
The guarantee was honoured, but was deprived of effect through adjustment of the bonus, which, 
according to the articles, was within the discretion of the directors. The House of Lords held that an 
implied term prevented the Society from declaring a differential final bonus and thereby depriving 
the annuity rate guarantee of substantial effect. The implication was not necessary to make the 
contract work. As Hugh Collins has pointed out, the contract could function perfectly well as an 
investment vehicle and pensions device without the implied term. 32  But the implication was 
necessary to avoid defeating the commercial object of the annuity rate guarantee, which Lord Steyn 
said was "to protect the policyholder against a fall in market annuity rates".33 The implication was 
needed, in other words, to protect a subsidiary contractual purpose. 
  
30  Belize Telecom, above n 1, at [32]. 
31  Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408 (HL). 
32  Hugh Collins "Implied Terms: The Foundation in Good Faith and Fair Dealing" (2014) 67 CLP  297 at 317. 
33  Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman, above n 31, at 459. 
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D Obviousness and Singularity 
1 An obvious solution 
It has been argued up to this point that the reader of a contractual instrument is compelled to 
conclude that the instrument must by implication include a particular provision if there is: first, a 
gap that must be filled; and secondly, an obvious means of filling it. I want to suggest, however, that 
what is needed is not necessarily an obvious solution to the problem in question, but one that is 
singularly apt. It is well accepted that, even if something is needed to make a contract work, a term 
will not be implied if there are several equally reasonable ways of solving the problem.34 This fits 
with the interpretative view of implied terms: if multiple equally compelling solutions are available 
then it cannot be said that the contract must mean that any one of them was adopted, and a 
reasonable addressee would not conclude that any term is implied. The unworkable contract cannot 
then be saved. 
It is not necessary, however, that the solution be an obvious one, but only that it be singularly 
appropriate. As Lord Justice Bingham has said, it must "be shown either that there was only one 
contractual solution or that one of several possible solutions would without doubt have been 
preferred".35 The distinction between an obvious solution and one that is singularly apt may not be 
significant in most cases because the solution will be obvious as well as singular. But as Lord 
Hoffmann pointed out in Belize Telecom, an implied term should not be barred on the basis that the 
answer to the problem is not immediately apparent and some careful consideration is needed, 
provided one would conclude that there is only one answer that is consistent with the instrument. 
Where the implied term expresses a singularly appropriate solution to a problem that must be 
solved, then a reasonable addressee would conclude that the instrument must mean that the solution 
is to be applied to resolve the problem. 
2 Obviously intended 
The discussion of "obviousness" thus far has referred to an obvious solution to the problem 
created by a contractual gap. In this area of the law, however, obviousness is usually used to refer to 
something that was obviously intended by the contracting parties. It is well accepted that logic and 
business efficacy alone are too constraining and do not exhaust the categories of terms implied in 
fact. The United Kingdom Supreme Court held in Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas that, although 
the elements set out by Lord Simon are otherwise cumulative, "necessity and obviousness … can be 
  
34  Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 WLR 601 (HL) at 609–
610 per Lord Pearson, with whom Lord Guest and Lord Diplock agreed, and 614 per Lord Cross; and 
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 (HCA) at 355–356 per 
Mason J, with whom Stephen and Wilson JJ agreed. 
35  Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [1995] EMLR 472 (CA) at 482 per 
Sir Thomas Bingham MR. 
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alternatives in the sense that only one of them needs to be satisfied".36 Whether something is so 
obvious that it goes without saying is usually tested through the application of the officious 
bystander test. The officious bystander test has been strongly criticised by scholars and judges on a 
number of different bases, most recently by Lord Hoffmann in Belize Telecom.37 As a legal standard 
or test, the idea of something being so obvious that it goes without saying is very weak. It does not 
prescribe a reasoning process and therefore functions as a statement of conclusion rather than a tool 
of analysis. 
Neither the obviousness standard nor the officious bystander test therefore provides a solid 
foundation for a conclusion that a contract must mean that a particular term was implied. But if 
necessity to avoid frustrating a contractual purpose is accepted as a basis for implication then 
obviousness is not needed as an alternative foundation. Many of the leading English cases that are 
commonly cited in support of the view that obviousness provides an alternative to business efficacy 
provide that support only by way of obiter dicta. The few cases which were decided on that footing 
are better explained on the basis that the term was necessary to avoid defeating a subsidiary 
contractual purpose.38 
E Meaning and Implication 
The implication of terms in fact can properly be understood as a gap-filling doctrine in the sense 
that, where the doctrine can be applied, it has the effect of filling gaps in the express terms. But 
since it fills those gaps through a process of construction, drawing on the sprit rather than the letter 
of contractual instruments, it can be concluded that in cases in which terms are implied in fact there 
is no gap in the meaning of the instrument. The implication of terms in fact is concerned to identify 
what a contractual instrument must mean as a matter of logic, in order to make the contract work or 
in order to avoid defeating a subsidiary contractual purpose. In the latter two cases the implication is 
compelled by the combination of necessity and the existence of a singularly apt solution to the 
problem at hand. 
III THE REMOTENESS RULE 
The remoteness rule has a much narrower scope of application than the implication of terms. It 
also has a fundamentally different orientation, being concerned with breach rather than 
performance. The implication of terms is concerned primarily with the parties' rights and obligations 
in relation to performance and the limits of their contractual powers and discretions. The remoteness 
rule, in contrast, simply determines the limits of a contract breaker's liability for damages. In dealing 
with remoteness issues, therefore, we are not only in the realm of breach, rather than performance, 
  
36  BNP Paribas (SC), above n 6, at [21]. 
37  Belize Telecom, above n 1, at [25]. 
38  See Robertson, above n 7. 
 THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT 201 
but are concerned only with the law's response to breach, which is to order the payment of 
compensatory damages.  
While contracting parties can exclude or limit the obligation to pay damages for breach and can 
stipulate for payment of liquidated damages, they commonly do not do so. The obligation to pay 
compensatory damages for breach is therefore a prime example of a default rule: it is a rule supplied 
by the law, which the parties can modify by agreement if they choose to do so.39 The basic principle 
that a party in breach of contract can be required to pay compensatory damages forms part of a 
broader set of default rules. The basic principle is supplemented by a set of rules that specify the 
way in which the defendant's liability to compensate the plaintiff will be determined and quantified, 
including rules on causation, remoteness, mitigation and the types of loss that are compensable. In 
some instances modification of the law's default rules on damages for breach constitutes an 
important part of the bargain, but in most cases there is no express modification of those rules. In 
cases where contract terms deal expressly with the payment of damages, then the extent of a 
contract breaker's liability for damages will clearly depend on an interpretation of the parties' 
agreement. But the present question is whether, in the absence of express provisions concerning 
damages for breach, the application of the default common law remoteness rule can be understood 
as an exercise in interpretation of the agreement. 
A The Basic Rule 
The essence of the remoteness rule is that a contract breaker is only liable for loss of a kind that 
was within the scope of reasonable contemplation at the time the contract was made. More fully, 
whether a defendant is liable for a particular type of loss depends on a question formulated along the 
following lines. If a reasonable person in the position of the defendant had, at the time the contract 
was made, considered the possibility of a breach, would loss of the relevant kind have been within 
that person's contemplation as a serious possibility or not unlikely consequence of the breach?40 
That question unifies the two limbs identified by Alderson B in Hadley v Baxendale: namely, loss 
arising "according to the usual course of things" and loss resulting from special circumstances 
known to the defendant.41 Expressed in terms of foreseeability, it may be said that a contract 
breaker is liable only for loss that could be foreseen as not unlikely to occur.42 
That core remoteness rule is understood by some to be founded on the agreement of the parties. 
In The Achilleas, a majority of the House of Lords considered that the rule simply identifies the 
  
39  See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner "Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules" (1989) 99 Yale LJ 87. 
40  Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd [1969] 1 AC 350 (HL) [The Heron II] at 385 per Lord Reid.  
41  Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 at 355. 
42  The Heron II, above n 40, at 389 per Lord Reid, using the word "likely", though "not unlikely" better 
reflects the views expressed in the other speeches. 
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risks for which the defendant can be said to have assumed responsibility. 43  The basis of the 
remoteness rule, according to Lord Hoffmann, is that contractual liability is voluntary and therefore 
extends only to risks voluntarily undertaken by the defendant: "It seems to me logical to found 
liability for damages upon the intention of the parties (objectively ascertained) because all 
contractual liability is voluntarily undertaken."44 
The interpretative basis of the core remoteness rule is put even more strongly by the editors of 
Chitty on Contracts, who suggest that:45 
… it can be said in general terms that the promisor implicitly accepts responsibility for the usual 
consequences of a breach of the promise in question, while the promisee implicitly accepts the risk of 
any other consequences. (In other words, the promisee implicitly agrees not to hold the promisor 
responsible for unusual consequences.) The test seems ultimately to depend on the express or implied 
intention of the parties.  
It is difficult to see this as anything other than a fiction. The idea is that the mere entry into a 
contract which creates performance obligations involves the acceptance of responsibility for the 
usual consequences of a breach of those obligations. Moreover, and even less credibly, the 
promisee's entry into the contract is itself said to imply a promise not to hold the promisor 
responsible for consequences lying outside the rule in Hadley v Baxendale. The entry into the 
contract is the only manifestation of assent to this allocation of risk. 
A significant barrier to understanding the remoteness rule in this way is the idea that contracting 
parties generally contract for performance rather than breach. Widespread assertions along these 
lines by judges and scholars are supported by the terms of most contracts, which typically say 
nothing about the consequences of breach.46 They are also supported by empirical studies showing 
that people are, in general, unrealistically optimistic and tend to underestimate the likelihood of 
adverse events.47 
This insight is important not because we are concerned about the subjective intentions of 
contracting parties, but because it tells us how we should interpret the behaviour and 
communications of contracting parties from an objective standpoint. It tells us what contracting 
parties can be taken to be communicating about, which is performance, rather than breach. Lord 
  
43  The Achilleas, above n 2, at [12]–[22] per Lord Hoffmann, [31]–[33] per Lord Hope and [69] per Lord 
Walker. 
44  At [12]. 
45  HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts (32nd ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at [26-107] (citations 
omitted). 
46  See Andrew Robertson "The Basis of the Remoteness Rule in Contract" (2008) 28 LS 172 at 176. 
47  At 176. 
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Hoffmann has pointed out extrajudicially that the test for remoteness is objective, so it does not 
matter what the parties did or did not consider or intend at the time of contracting. 48  But if 
contracting parties stipulate only performance terms and there is no indication that they adverted to 
the possibility of breach, let alone its consequences, then there is unlikely to be any objective 
manifestation of an intention to allocate the risk of particular consequences of breach. The entry into 
a contract that includes only performance terms does not communicate anything about liability for 
the consequences of breach. 
If the remoteness rule cannot be understood as a means of interpreting the agreement or 
identifying an allocation of risk made by the contracting parties, then we must accept that it is an 
externally imposed rule based on fairness. It is a default rule which effects a fair allocation of a risk 
which the parties themselves have failed to allocate.49 It is fair to hold a contract breaker liable only 
for loss of a kind that a reasonable person would have contemplated if he or she turned his or her 
mind to the possibility of the relevant type of breach at the time the contract was made. This gives a 
contracting party an opportunity to consider the risks that might arise from breach and, where 
necessary, take action either to avoid them or factor them into the contract price. More extensive 
liability could deprive the contract breaker of a reasonable opportunity to behave differently in the 
face of that risk. 
The choice between these two alternative explanations for the remoteness rule is not simply an 
academic question. The basis of the rule is of great importance because it determines the scope of 
application of the rule and the circumstances in which it is appropriate or necessary to depart from 
it.  
B Departures from the Basic Rule 
It is now well accepted that the core remoteness rule may work injustice in some instances. 
First, the rule may in some situations be under-inclusive. There may be circumstances in which a 
particular type of loss is insufficiently likely to satisfy the basic rule, but the party in breach should 
nevertheless be held liable for that loss. The under-inclusiveness of the rule may be thought to be 
illustrated by Supershield Ltd v Siemens Building Technologies FE Ltd.50 In that case the negligent 
installation of a float valve on a water tank caused damage by flooding, but only because a back-up 
bunding and drainage system also happened to fail. The presence of the bund wall and drains meant 
that flooding was an unlikely outcome of the failure of the valve, but the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales nevertheless held that the loss was not too remote. The case does not seem to 
evidence the under-inclusiveness of the basic remoteness rule, however, but only to tell us that some 
  
48  Lord Hoffmann "The Achilleas: Custom and Practice or Foreseeability?" (2010) 14 Edin LR 47 at 60. 
49  Robertson, above n 46, at 180–181. 
50  Supershield Ltd v Siemens Building Technologies FE Ltd, above n 5.  
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flexibility is needed in relation to the degree of probability, especially in cases where the only real 
risk arising from a breach is one that is quite unlikely to eventuate. Alternatively, as Andrew 
Burrows has argued, it might be thought necessary to take account of the purpose of the duty that 
has been broken.51 The risk that eventuated was the very risk that the customer sought to guard 
against through the installation of the float valve. 
A slightly more significant problem is that it may not always be just to impose liability for loss 
that is within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. The well-worn hypothetical illustration is 
a taxi driver who accepts a fare knowing that his passenger is on her way to an important business 
meeting and stands to lose the benefit of a substantial business deal if she is late. If the driver 's 
breach of contract causes the passenger to miss the meeting, the passenger's consequential loss falls 
within the rule. It may be doubted whether the driver should be held liable for that loss, but different 
reasons have been advanced to explain why that is the case, and different principles advanced to 
explain the basis on which, and therefore the circumstances in which, the courts should depart from 
the basic remoteness principle. 
If the basis of the remoteness rule is that the law provides for a fair allocation of a risk that was 
not allocated by the parties, then a departure is justified where the core rule does not produce a fair 
allocation. The second Restatement of Contracts suggests that in the United States foreseeable loss 
will not always be recoverable, and the court may limit a damages award in order to avoid 
disproportion between defendant's liability and the benefit he or she stood to receive from the 
contract.52 A simple rule of that kind is sufficient to deal with the taxi driver example, but more 
sophisticated riders or qualifications to the basic remoteness rule have been proposed, encompassing 
a wide range of matters such as whether the defendant had an opportunity to limit his or her 
liability, the nature and extent of the defendant's culpability and insurance practices in the relevant 
industry.53 
In The Achilleas some members of the House of Lords preferred an interpretative explanation 
for departures from the remoteness rule in situations like the taxi driver example and, accordingly, 
an interpretative approach to determining when there should be a departure from the basic rule. The 
Achilleas concerned the late redelivery of a ship by a charterer. On its last voyage, the ship was 
delayed in port and the charterers returned the ship nine days late. That late redelivery caused the 
owner to miss the last delivery date for the follow-on charter. This in turn gave the follow-on 
charterer the right to cancel, which they were no doubt pleased to be able to do because market rates 
had been very high when the follow-on charter had been fixed, and had since fallen sharply. The 
  
51  Burrows, above n 3, at 263. 
52  American Law Institute Restatement of Contracts (2nd ed, St Paul, Minnesota, 1981) § 351(3). 
53  See Robertson, above n 46, drawing on, inter alia, Robin Cooke "Remoteness of Damages and Judicial 
Discretion" (1978) 37 CLJ 288. See also McLauchlan "Remoteness Reinvented", above n 3, at 129–133. 
 THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT 205 
owner therefore had to accept a much lower rate from the follow-on charterer, resulting in a loss of 
approximately USD 1,300,000. 
The Achilleas raised the question whether a charterer breaching a contract through late 
redelivery was liable for loss of profit on a subsequent charter. There was an understanding in the 
shipping industry that a charterer's liability for late redelivery was limited to the difference between 
the market rate and the charter rate for the period of the overrun, and this understanding was 
supported by obiter dicta in some cases and statements in textbooks. On that basis, the charterer's 
liability would have been about USD 160,000. The majority arbitrators nevertheless held that the 
loss fell within the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale and was therefore not too remote. It was within 
the scope of reasonable contemplation at the time the contract was made that a follow-on charter 
was likely to have been fixed and would be placed in jeopardy by late redelivery. Christopher 
Clarke J agreed, as did a unanimous Court of Appeal. 
The House of Lords held unanimously that the loss was too remote. Lord Hoffmann and Lord 
Hope held in effect that there was an exception to the general remoteness rule in the case of loss of a 
type or kind for which the defendant has not assumed responsibility.54 Lord Rodger and Baroness 
Hale held that the loss was too remote under the basic remoteness rule: the loss was a result of the 
extreme volatility in the market, which could not have been reasonably foreseen as likely to arise 
out of the delay.55 Lord Walker gave similar reasons but also agreed with Lord Hoffmann, Lord 
Hope and Lord Roger,56 leaving scope for argument as to the effect of the decision on the status of 
the remoteness rule. 
If the crucial issue is whether the defendant has assumed responsibility for the type of loss in 
question, how are courts and legal advisers to determine whether the defendant has done so? In The 
Achilleas both Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope based the conclusion that the charterer had not 
assumed responsibility for the loss of the follow-on charter squarely on the fact that the loss could 
not be controlled or quantified by the charterer.57 But as David McLauchlan and Andrew Burrows 
have pointed out, it is not uncommon for a contract breaker to be held liable for loss that he or she 
cannot quantify, predict or control.58 The Heron II is one prominent example of this.59 Another 
explanation, which was subsequently given extrajudicially by Lord Hoffmann, is that the industry 
understanding justified the conclusion that the defendant had not assumed responsibility for the 
  
54   The Achilleas, above n 2, at [12]–[26] per Lord Hoffmann and [32] per Lord Hope. 
55  At [60] per Lord Rodger and [91]–[93] per Baroness Hale. 
56  At [87]. 
57  At [23] per Lord Hoffmann and [36] per Lord Hope.  
58  Burrows, above n 3, at 257; and McLauchlan "Remoteness Reinvented?", above n 3, at 124. 
59  The Heron II, above n 40.  
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risk.60 But even assuming that we can attribute the industry understanding to the defendants, it 
reflected what they might be taken to have thought the law was, not the liability they were 
assuming.  
The Achilleas is now understood to have changed English law on remoteness, leaving the basic 
rule in place, but allowing for departure where loss is either within reasonable contemplation but the 
defendant cannot be understood to have assumed responsibility for it, or loss is outside reasonable 
contemplation but the defendant has assumed responsibility for it. 61  The problem with this 
development is that it is founded on the idea that the core remoteness rule generally identifies types 
of loss for which the defendant has assumed responsibility. If the core remoteness rule (of liability 
for loss that is within the scope of reasonable contemplation) cannot convincingly be understood to 
identify such types of loss, then it is entirely unclear when the general rule should be applied and 
when departure is justified. In providing a qualification of uncertain scope to the core remoteness 
rule, The Achilleas renders uncertain the scope of application of the core rule. In the absence of a 
discernable manifestation of intention, there is no reliable or clear basis for saying that the defendant 
has or has not assumed responsibility for any particular kind of loss. There is therefore no reliable 
way of knowing when the core rule should be applied. Moreover, unlike the implication of terms, it 
is not possible to identify any general paths of reasoning leading to the conclusion that a contractual 
instrument must be understood to mean that a risk has or has not been assumed by a defendant.62 
Uncomfortable as it may be to acknowledge that the remoteness rule is based on fairness, rather 
than interpretation, it is necessary to do so in order to develop an understanding of the factors to be 
taken into account in determining whether and when there should be departures from the core rule 
of liability for types of loss that are within the scope of reasonable contemplation. To take just one 
example, it is unclear whether the defendant's culpability is a relevant question. A particular issue is 
whether a defendant who has deliberately broken a contract should be liable for loss that is outside 
the scope of reasonable contemplation. While some have argued that the defendant's culpability is a 
relevant question,63 Andrew Burrows has suggested that this "seems alien to the English approach 
in contract law".64 If it were openly acknowledged that the remoteness rule is based on fairness and 
  
60  As Andrew Burrows has pointed out, the existence of an industry understanding as to the limits of a carrier's 
liability based on a longstanding Court of Appeal decision (The Parana (1877) 2 PD 118 (CA)) did not stop 
the House of Lords in The Heron II from awarding a loss of profits against a carrier in contravention of that 
understanding of the law. See Burrows, above n 3, at 257–258.  
61  See the cases cited above at n 5. 
62  Although it is possible to identify some kinds of conduct by which a defendant might manifest an intention 
to accept a particular risk, such as raising the contract price on learning of it, cases involving such 
manifestations of intention do not seem to come before the courts. 
63  See Robertson, above n 46, at 192–193. 
64  Burrows, above n 3, at 264, n 46. 
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that departures from the core rule depend on fairness considerations, it is difficult to imagine that 
basic questions such as the relevance of the defendant's culpability could remain unresolved for 
long. Under an interpretative approach to remoteness, on the other hand, the relevance of the 
defendant's culpability, like any other factor, remains an open question in each case.65 
IV CONCLUSION 
The implication of terms may be understood as an exercise in wringing the last drops of 
meaning from a contractual instrument. The contractual instruments under analysis do not provide 
explicit answers to the issues in question. But we can identify paths of reasoning leading 
convincingly to the conclusion that the instruments in question must be understood to mean that the 
problems that have arisen are to be resolved in particular ways. It should not be surprising that the 
various accepted tests for implication provide some very useful guidance as to the paths of 
reasoning that can lead to that conclusion. The implication of terms does lie within the bounds of the 
interpretative enterprise, but it is not sufficient simply to ask what the instrument means. More 
precise guidance is needed. The case law provides guidance as to the available paths of reasoning, 
but viewing implication as an exercise in interpretation undoubtedly helps to illuminate those paths. 
There are, however, no similar abstract paths of reasoning available in the remoteness cases. In 
the absence of a manifestation of intention (such as an increase in price in response to being 
informed of a particular risk), there are no convincing bases on which we can conclude that the 
parties have implicitly allocated responsibility for remote risks. It may be an uncomfortable fact that 
the allocation of an unallocated contractual risk is sometimes a matter for the law. But if an 
allocation of risk has been left to the law, then that fact must be recognised before we can begin to 
understand and analyse the principles that govern the basis on which the law is to make that 
allocation. The application of interpretative principles to a set of cases in which there is typically no 
relevant manifestation of intention, and no basis on which to determine what the instrument must 
mean, is an unsettling development and an unilluminating addition to the law. 
 
  
  
65  See McLauchlan "Remoteness Reinvented?", above n 3, at n 146.  
208 (2016) 47 VUWLR 
 
 
